Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2017-0072MaRDI QIDQ2098976zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date 22 November 2022

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2017-0072

zbMATH Keywords

marginal stabilityBayesian incentive compatibilityinterim individual rationalityefficient combinatorial allocationsopt-out types

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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• Optimal combinatorial mechanism design
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3673817 (Why is no real title available?)
• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Combinatorial auctions. Foreword by Vernon L. Smith.
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Incentives in Teams
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Package Auctions and Exchanges
• Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
• Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation

Cited in

(5)

• Efficient allocations under ambiguity
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2214057 (Why is no real title available?)
• Efficient intertemporal allocations with recursive utility.
• An Exact Analysis of Stable Allocation
• Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties

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