Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2006.06.004zbMATH Open1163.91503OpenAlexW2015156887MaRDI QIDQ2467483FDOQ2467483

Authors: Mourad Baïou, Michel Balinski 

Publication date: 21 January 2008

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2006.06.004

Recommendations

• The Stable Allocation (or Ordinal Transportation) Problem
• The Generalized Stable Allocation Problem
• On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
• Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem

zbMATH Keywords

many-to-many matchinguniversity admissionsstable marriagestable assignmenttwo-sided marketordinal transportation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• The College Admissions Problem Revisited
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
• The Stable Allocation (or Ordinal Transportation) Problem
• Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
• Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
• Student admissions and faculty recruitment

Cited In (9)

• An Exact Analysis of Stable Allocation
• A note on many-to-many matchings and stable allocations
• Paths to Stable Allocations
• A characterization of equilibria in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism
• The Stable Allocation (or Ordinal Transportation) Problem
• Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
• On the Lattice Structure of Stable Allocations in a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market
• Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
• Stable sharing

This page was built for publication: Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2467483)