Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences

DOI10.1016/J.DAM.2014.07.003MaRDI QIDQ477355zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima, Yusuke Narita

Publication date 3 December 2014

Published in Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2014.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymonotonicitystrategy-proofnessPareto efficiencymany-to-many two-sided matchingmax-min preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488104

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
• Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results

Cited in

(13)

• A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
• Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
• A one-sided many-to-many matching problem
• A note on many-to-many matchings and stable allocations
• Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
• The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
• The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
• Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand
• Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
• Efficiency and stability in a process of teams formation
• The stable b-matching polytope revisited
• Role of common preferences in the outcome of many-to-many matching

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