Efficiency and stability in a process of teams formation

DOI10.1007/S13235-022-00438-YMaRDI QIDQ2105697zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Leonardo Boncinelli, Alessio Muscillo, Paolo Pin

Publication date 8 December 2022

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.13712

zbMATH Keywords

networksstochastic stabilityteam formationcoalitional stabilityco-authorshipmyopic team-wise stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Abstract: Motivated by data on coauthorships in scientific publications, we analyze a team formation process that generalizes matching models and network formation models, allowing for overlapping teams of heterogeneous size. We apply different notions of stability: myopic team-wise stability, which extends to our setup the concept of pair-wise stability, coalitional stability, where agents are perfectly rational and able to coordinate, and stochastic stability, where agents are myopic and errors occur with vanishing probability. We find that, in many cases, coalitional stability in no way refines myopic team-wise stability, while stochastically stable states are feasible states that maximize the overall number of activities performed by teams.

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Cited in

(7)

• Team formation: Matching quality supply and quality demand.
• Self-organizing teams
• Co-authorship model with link strength
• Balancing stability and efficiency in team formation as a generalized roommate problem
• A balanced team-generating model for teams with less than nine persons
• Efficiency and stability in a discrete model of country formation
• Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation

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