Efficiency and stability in a process of teams formation
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Publication:2105697
DOI10.1007/S13235-022-00438-YzbMATH Open1505.91264arXiv2103.13712OpenAlexW4221010416MaRDI QIDQ2105697FDOQ2105697
Authors: Leonardo Boncinelli, Alessio Muscillo, Paolo Pin 
Publication date: 8 December 2022
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: Motivated by data on coauthorships in scientific publications, we analyze a team formation process that generalizes matching models and network formation models, allowing for overlapping teams of heterogeneous size. We apply different notions of stability: myopic team-wise stability, which extends to our setup the concept of pair-wise stability, coalitional stability, where agents are perfectly rational and able to coordinate, and stochastic stability, where agents are myopic and errors occur with vanishing probability. We find that, in many cases, coalitional stability in no way refines myopic team-wise stability, while stochastically stable states are feasible states that maximize the overall number of activities performed by teams.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.13712
Recommendations
networksstochastic stabilityteam formationcoalitional stabilityco-authorshipmyopic team-wise stability
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