Coalition formation among farsighted agents

DOI10.3390/G1030286MaRDI QIDQ2344941zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch, P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030286

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationfarsighted playersstability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
• The farsighted stable set
• Stable coalition structures under restricted coalitional changes
• Rational expectations and farsighted stability

Cites work

• A model of agreements in strategic form games
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
• Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
• Efficiency in coalition games with externalities
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Farsighted stability in hedonic games
• Farsightedly stable networks
• Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
• On coalition formation: durable coalition structures.
• Rationalizability for social environments
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
• Strongly stable networks
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures

Cited in

(26)

• Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
• Stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games: a coincidence between myopia and farsightedness
• Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
• Efficiency and stability in a process of teams formation
• Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable sets
• On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players
• Stable farsighted coalitions in competitive markets
• Coalition formation and history dependence
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2067999 (Why is no real title available?)
• The farsighted stable set
• Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems
• Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
• Maximality in the farsighted stable set
• The myopic stable set for social environments
• Stable coalition structures under restricted coalitional changes
• Social rationalizability with mediation
• Coalition formation under dominance invariance
• Subgame perfect coalition formation
• Coalition formation in games with externalities
• Minimal farsighted instability
• On the farsightedly and myopically stable international environmental agreements
• Credible sets
• Matching markets with farsighted couples
• Farsightedly stable tariffs

This page was built for publication: Coalition formation among farsighted agents

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2344941)