Coalition formation among farsighted agents
Summary: A set of coalition structures \(P\) is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to \(P\) to a coalition structure outside \(P\) are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improvingpath from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of \(P\) satisfying the first two conditions. A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characterization of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Finally, we illustrate our results by means of coalition formation games with positive spillovers.
- A model of agreements in strategic form games
- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
- Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
- Efficiency in coalition games with externalities
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Farsighted stability in hedonic games
- Farsightedly stable networks
- Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
- On coalition formation: durable coalition structures.
- Rationalizability for social environments
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
- Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
- Strongly stable networks
- The stability of hedonic coalition structures
- Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
- Stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games: a coincidence between myopia and farsightedness
- Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
- Efficiency and stability in a process of teams formation
- Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable sets
- On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players
- Stable farsighted coalitions in competitive markets
- Coalition formation and history dependence
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2067999 (Why is no real title available?)
- The farsighted stable set
- Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems
- Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
- Maximality in the farsighted stable set
- The myopic stable set for social environments
- Stable coalition structures under restricted coalitional changes
- Social rationalizability with mediation
- Coalition formation under dominance invariance
- Subgame perfect coalition formation
- Coalition formation in games with externalities
- Minimal farsighted instability
- On the farsightedly and myopically stable international environmental agreements
- Credible sets
- Matching markets with farsighted couples
- Farsightedly stable tariffs
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