Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.06.003zbMath1155.91308MaRDI QIDQ1005742

Sylvain Béal, Philippe Solal, Jacques Durieu

Publication date: 10 March 2009

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2511/1/dp07_57.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative games; Shapley value; consistent set; farsighted core; von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

A theory of farsightedness in committee games, An existence result for farsighted stable sets of games in characteristic function form, Farsightedly stable tariffs, Fair stable sets of simple games, On the non-emptiness of the one-core and the bargaining set of committee games, Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies, Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable sets

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