Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2008.06.003zbMath1155.91308OpenAlexW2034095912MaRDI QIDQ1005742

Jacques Durieu, Sylvain Béal, Philippe Solal

Publication date: 10 March 2009

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2511/1/dp07_57.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesShapley valueconsistent setfarsighted corevon Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (8)

Fair stable sets of simple games ⋮ On the non-emptiness of the one-core and the bargaining set of committee games ⋮ Farsightedly stable tariffs ⋮ A theory of farsightedness in committee games ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies ⋮ An existence result for farsighted stable sets of games in characteristic function form ⋮ Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable sets

Cites Work

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• A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Nonemptiness of the largest consistent set
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• Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
• Networks and farsighted stability
• Farsighted stability in average return games
• Cores of convex games
• Farsighted stability in hedonic games
• Farsighted stability in an \(n\)-person prisoner's dilemma
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition

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