Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies
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Publication:1757079
DOI10.1007/s00182-017-0597-3zbMath1418.91045OpenAlexW2765968078MaRDI QIDQ1757079
Publication date: 28 December 2018
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://toyama.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_uri&item_id=13949
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