A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.08.014zbMath1211.91170OpenAlexW2142851892MaRDI QIDQ533919

Markus Walzl, Olivier Bochet, Bettina Klaus

Publication date: 10 May 2011

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/textes/10.02.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic stabilitycoreindivisible goodslimit invariant distribution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic models in economics (91B70) Trade models (91B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Stochastic stability for roommate markets ⋮ Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies ⋮ A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets

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