A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2010.08.014MaRDI QIDQ533919zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bettina Klaus, Olivier Bochet, M. Walzl

Publication date 10 May 2011

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/textes/10.02.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

corestochastic stabilityindivisible goodslimit invariant distribution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Stochastic models in economics (91B70) Trade models (91B60)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1239549 (Why is no real title available?)
• A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets
• A stochastic bargaining process for \(n\)-person games
• Collective Choice Correspondences as Admissible Outcomes of Social Bargaining Processes
• Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.
• Farsighted stability of the competitive allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• On cores and indivisibility
• On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
• Recontracting Stability
• Stochastic stability in a double auction
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process
• The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible
• The evolution of social and economic networks.
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(5)

• A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets
• Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market
• Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies
• Stochastic stability for roommate markets
• Computing the Deficiency of Housing Markets with Duplicate Houses

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