A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2010.08.014zbMATH Open1211.91170OpenAlexW2142851892MaRDI QIDQ533919FDOQ533919

Authors: Bettina Klaus, Olivier Bochet, M. Walzl 

Publication date: 10 May 2011

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/textes/10.02.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

corestochastic stabilityindivisible goodslimit invariant distribution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Stochastic models in economics (91B70) Trade models (91B60)

Cites Work

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• Stochastic stability in a double auction
• Collective Choice Correspondences as Admissible Outcomes of Social Bargaining Processes
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
• The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible
• A stochastic bargaining process for \(n\)-person games
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• Farsighted stability of the competitive allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods
• A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets

Cited In (5)

• A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets
• Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market
• Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies
• Stochastic stability for roommate markets
• Computing the Deficiency of Housing Markets with Duplicate Houses

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