The evolution of exchange.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00112-1zbMATH Open1063.91502OpenAlexW1990325023MaRDI QIDQ1427490FDOQ1427490

Authors: Assaf Ben-Shoham, Roberto Serrano, Oscar Volij 

Publication date: 14 March 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00112-1

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• Stable processes of exchange
• Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market
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zbMATH Keywords

EfficiencyStochastic stabilityEnvyHousing problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22) Stochastic models in economics (91B70)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Bilateral Trading Processes, Pairwise Optimally, and Pareto Optimality
• On cores and indivisibility
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
• Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games.
• Pairwise, t-Wise, and Pareto Optimalities

Cited In (14)

• Stochastic stability in assignment problems
• Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare
• Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets
• A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets
• The anonymous core of an exchange economy.
• Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market
• Stochastic stability in best shot network games
• Decentralised exchange, out-of-equilibrium dynamics and convergence to efficiency
• Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
• Evolutionary game theory
• Evolution and jump in a Walrasian framework
• Stable processes of exchange
• In defense of DEFECT.
• House exchange and residential segregation in networks

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