An evolutionary model of bargaining
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Publication:1804019
DOI10.1006/JETH.1993.1009zbMATH Open0778.90096OpenAlexW2136697899MaRDI QIDQ1804019FDOQ1804019
Authors: H. Peyton Young 
Publication date: 29 June 1993
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1009
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Cited In (77)
- Bargaining and negative externalities
- On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games
- Coordination and culture
- An adaptive model of demand adjustment in weighted majority games
- Bargaining power in communication networks
- Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games
- How robust is the equal split norm? Responsive strategies, selection mechanisms and the need for economic interpretation of simulation parameters
- Social learning and the shadow of the past
- Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games
- Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games
- Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetry
- Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.
- Focal points and bargaining
- The evolution of parental investment: re-examining the anisogamy argument
- Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play
- Bargaining with revoking costs
- Adaptive dynamics in games played by heterogeneous populations
- Robust stochastic stability
- Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games.
- On efficiency, tie-breaking rules and role assignment procedures in evolutionary bargaining.
- Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
- Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach
- Evolutionary learning in signalling games
- Two-person bargaining experiments with incomplete information
- Evolution of equity norms in small-world networks
- Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms
- Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game
- Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
- Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model
- Information, interaction and memory
- Implementing equal division with an ultimatum threat
- Clever agents in adaptive learning.
- Bilateral bargaining. Theory and applications
- Stochastic stability in a double auction
- Evolutionary game theory
- Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games
- Cognitive hierarchies in adaptive play
- Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining.
- Bargaining and the evolution of cooperation in a dynamic game
- THE DISCRETIZATION OF CONTINUUM STRATEGY SPACES
- Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems
- Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame.
- Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations
- Imitation with asymmetric memory
- The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining
- The evolution of exchange.
- A dynamic foundation of the Rawlsian maxmin criterion
- Replicator dynamics of symmetric ultimatum game
- In defense of DEFECT.
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Learning to play limited forecast equilibria
- Stochastic stability on general state spaces
- Evolution of fairness in the one-shot anonymous ultimatum game
- Property rights and investments: an evolutionary approach
- Bargaining over a common categorisation
- Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences
- A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
- Evolution, investment, and bargaining
- Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk-dove game
- Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule
- The cultural Red King effect
- Predicting behavior in unstructured bargaining with a probability distribution
- Deep and shallow thinking in the long run
- Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining
- An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games
- Persistence of discrimination: revisiting Axtell, Epstein and Young
- Articulating bargaining theories: movement, chance, and necessity as descriptive principles
- Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
- BARGAINING POWER IN THE NASH DEMAND GAME AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
- Fictitious play property of the Nash demand game
- (In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games
- Initiating bargaining
- Belief in egalitarianism and meritocracy
- ON THE EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY OF "TOUGH" BARGAINING BEHAVIOR
- On bargaining norms as solutions to cost-minimization problems
- A note on the risk dominance of the Nash demand game
- EVOLUTION IN IMPERFECT COMMITMENT BARGAINING—STRATEGIC VERSUS IGNORANT TYPES
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