An evolutionary model of bargaining
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Publication:1804019
DOI10.1006/jeth.1993.1009zbMath0778.90096OpenAlexW2136697899MaRDI QIDQ1804019
Publication date: 29 June 1993
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1009
Cooperative games (91A12) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Protein sequences, DNA sequences (92D20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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