Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
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Publication:1651852
DOI10.3390/g7020010zbMath1405.91330OpenAlexW2326341771MaRDI QIDQ1651852
Bary S. R. Pradelski, Heinrich H. Nax
Publication date: 10 July 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g7020010
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Related Items (5)
Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies ⋮ An adaptive model of demand adjustment in weighted majority games ⋮ Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems ⋮ The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets ⋮ Asymptotic stability in the Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic for cooperative games
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