Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
Summary: We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through wage offers and wage demands, firms compete over workers and workers compete over jobs. Firms make hire-and-fire decisions dependent on the wages of their own workers and on the alternative workers available on the job market. Workers bargain for better jobs; either individually or collectively as unions, adjusting wage demands upward/downward depending on whether they are currently employed/unemployed. We show that such a process is absorbed into the core with probability one in finite time. Moreover, within the core, allocations are selected that are characterized by surplus splitting according to a bargaining solution such that (i) firms and workforce share total revenue according to relative bargaining strengths, and (ii) workers receive equal workforce shares above their individual outside options. These results bridge empirical evidence and provide a rich set of testable predictions.
- Decentralized job matching
- Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core
- Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries
- Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives
- Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market
- A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
- A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
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- An evolutionary model of bargaining
- Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks
- Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Decentralized job matching
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
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- The assignment game. I: The core
- The evolution of social and economic networks.
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- The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets
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- Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core
- Job matching and coalition formation with utility or disutility of co-workers
- The strategic decentralization of recruiting
- Shining with the stars: competition, screening, and concern for coworkers' quality
- Exchange networks with stochastic matching
- Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market
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