Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.09.007zbMATH Open1156.91319OpenAlexW3123073578WikidataQ56936126 ScholiaQ56936126MaRDI QIDQ863281FDOQ863281

Authors: Sergiu Hart, Andreu Mas-Colell 

Publication date: 26 January 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~hart/papers/uncoupl-st.pdf?

Recommendations

• Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria
• Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing
• Uncoupled automata and pure Nash equilibria
• Learning dynamics in games with stochastic perturbations
• NEWTONIAN MECHANICS AND NASH PLAY

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumstochastic dynamicsfinite automatonfinite memoryexhaustive experimentationfinite recalluncoupled

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
• A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
• Adaptive Heuristics
• Three problems in learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
• Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium.
• Cooperation and bounded recall
• Regret-based continuous-time dynamics.
• Dynamic fictitious play, dynamic gradient play, and distributed convergence to Nash equilibria
• Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing

Cited In (31)

• Learning in Games
• Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
• How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures
• Learning by trial and error
• The possible and the impossible in multi-agent learning
• The query complexity of correlated equilibria
• A random time-dependent noncooperative equilibrium problem
• Online calibrated forecasts: memory efficiency versus universality for learning in games
• Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems
• Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria
• Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
• Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics
• Average testing and Pareto efficiency
• On the communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria
• How long to Pareto efficiency?
• Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing
• Multi-agent learning for engineers
• Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Stochastic equilibria in von Neumann--Gale dynamical systems
• Pure and randomized equilibria in the stochastic von Neumann-Gale model
• Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness
• Dynamic exploitation of myopic best response
• A strategic learning algorithm for state-based games
• On the approximation performance of fictitious play in finite games
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• Learning, hypothesis testing, and rational-expectations equilibrium
• Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria
• Uncoupled automata and pure Nash equilibria
• A unified stochastic approximation framework for learning in games
• A behavioral study of ``noise in coordination games

This page was built for publication: Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q863281)