Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium
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Publication:863281
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.007zbMath1156.91319OpenAlexW3123073578WikidataQ56936126 ScholiaQ56936126MaRDI QIDQ863281
Andreu Mas-Colell, Sergiu Hart
Publication date: 26 January 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~hart/papers/uncoupl-st.pdf?
Nash equilibriumstochastic dynamicsfinite automatonfinite memoryexhaustive experimentationfinite recalluncoupled
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Cites Work
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- Three problems in learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
- Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
- Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium.
- Regret-based continuous-time dynamics.
- Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing
- A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
- Dynamic fictitious play, dynamic gradient play, and distributed convergence to Nash equilibria
- Adaptive Heuristics
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