Communication complexity of correlated equilibrium with small support
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Publication:5009504
DOI10.4230/LIPICS.APPROX-RANDOM.2018.12MaRDI QIDQ5009504FDOQ5009504
Authors: Anat Ganor, C. S. Karthik 
Publication date: 4 August 2021
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