Simple Adaptive Strategies

DOI10.1142/8408zbMath1298.91019OpenAlexW4232519707MaRDI QIDQ2868742

Sergiu Hart, Andreu Mas-Colell

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: World Scientific Series in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/8408

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriumregret matchinglearning in gamesuncoupled dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Fundamental topics (basic mathematics, methodology; applicable to economics in general) (91B02) Proceedings, conferences, collections, etc. pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-06) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Collections of reprinted articles (00B60)

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