Markets, correlation, and regret-matching

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.06.009zbMATH Open1347.91188OpenAlexW2257280655WikidataQ56936103 ScholiaQ56936103MaRDI QIDQ495654FDOQ495654

Andreu Mas-Colell, Sergiu Hart

Publication date: 15 September 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.009

zbMATH Keywords

dynamicscorrelated equilibriumWalrasian equilibriumdeterministic regret-matching dynamicsexchange economiesHannan setimplementation of Walrasian equilibriaregret-matchingsocially concave gamessunspot equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

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Cited In (4)

• Strong robustness to incomplete information and the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium
• Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics
• Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium
• The evolution of monetary equilibrium

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