Markets, correlation, and regret-matching
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.06.009zbMATH Open1347.91188OpenAlexW2257280655WikidataQ56936103 ScholiaQ56936103MaRDI QIDQ495654FDOQ495654
Authors: Sergiu Hart, Andreu Mas-Colell 
Publication date: 15 September 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.009
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dynamicscorrelated equilibriumWalrasian equilibriumdeterministic regret-matching dynamicsexchange economiesHannan setimplementation of Walrasian equilibriaregret-matchingsocially concave gamessunspot equilibrium
Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
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- Feasible and Continuous Implementation
- Simple adaptive strategies. From regret-matching to uncoupled dynamics. With the collaboration of Yakov Babichenko, Amotz Cahn, Yishay Mansour and David Schmeidler
- Correlated equilibria and sunspots
- Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium
- Sunspots, correlation and competition
- Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
Cited In (4)
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