Feasible and Continuous Implementation
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Publication:4207765
DOI10.2307/2297503zbMath0688.90013OpenAlexW2062003024MaRDI QIDQ4207765
David Wettstein, Andrew Postlewaite
Publication date: 1989
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297503
Walrasian allocationsexistence of a game formimmunity with respect to strategic behaviorNash equilibrium allocations
Related Items (35)
Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms ⋮ Nash implementation in production economies ⋮ Divide-and-permute ⋮ Allocation of resources in a divisionalized firm ⋮ Credible implementation ⋮ Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types ⋮ Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies ⋮ Equity and the Vickrey allocation rule on general preference domains ⋮ Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities ⋮ Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines ⋮ Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets. ⋮ The evolution of monetary equilibrium ⋮ Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism ⋮ Privacy in implementation ⋮ Implementation with partial provability ⋮ Cost sharing: Efficiency and implementation ⋮ Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication ⋮ Nash implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem ⋮ Markets, correlation, and regret-matching ⋮ Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information ⋮ A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems ⋮ The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation ⋮ Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies ⋮ Implementation in production economies with increasing returns ⋮ Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale ⋮ Implementation with evidence ⋮ Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations ⋮ Incentives and competitive allocations in exchange economies with incomplete markets ⋮ Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension ⋮ Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer ⋮ Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear ⋮ Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships ⋮ Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with any number of goods ⋮ Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
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