Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- A Note on the Characterization of Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences
- A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- Bayesian Implementation
- Bayesian monotonicity with side payments
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
- Continuous and feasible implementation of rational-expectations Lindahl allocations
- Convergence of stochastic processes
- Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
- Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
- Feasible and Continuous Implementation
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3644750 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650248 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4145617 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3671967 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3673817 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3245885 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3274494 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations
- Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
- Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
- Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
- Incentives in Teams
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
- On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
- On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
- Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
- Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
Cited in
(7)- A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
- Virtual implementation in separable Bayesian environments using simple mechanisms
- Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information
- An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Virtual Bayesian Implementation
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
This page was built for publication: Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1371183)
