Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00804-5zbMATH Open0887.90008MaRDI QIDQ1371183FDOQ1371183

Publication date: 25 May 1998

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

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incentive compatibility dominant strategy equilibrium Bayesian strategy equilibrium incomplete information environments virtual implementability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cited In (6)

Virtual implementation in separable Bayesian environments using simple mechanisms
Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo
Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information
A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation

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