Bayesian monotonicity with side payments

DOI10.1006/JETH.1993.1007zbMath0779.90008OpenAlexW1993694831MaRDI QIDQ1804017

Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date: 29 June 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1007

zbMATH Keywords

side paymentsBayesian Nash implementationBayesian monotonicityno-consistent-deception condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (14)

Coalition-proof full efficient implementation ⋮ Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance ⋮ Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types ⋮ Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation ⋮ Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments ⋮ Quantum Bayesian implementation ⋮ Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies ⋮ Role of honesty in full implementation ⋮ A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions ⋮ A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation ⋮ Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Aggregation of expert opinions ⋮ A note on Matsushima's regularity condition ⋮ Epistemological implementation of social choice functions

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