Bayesian monotonicity with side payments

DOI10.1006/JETH.1993.1007zbMATH Open0779.90008OpenAlexW1993694831MaRDI QIDQ1804017FDOQ1804017

Authors: Hitoshi Matsushima 

Publication date: 29 June 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1007

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zbMATH Keywords

side paymentsBayesian Nash implementationBayesian monotonicityno-consistent-deception condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cited In (14)

• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Aggregation of expert opinions
• Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
• Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
• Quantum Bayesian implementation
• Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
• A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
• A note on Matsushima's regularity condition
• A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions
• Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies
• Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
• Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
• Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance
• Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments

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