Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
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Publication:2100648
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.007zbMath1505.91165OpenAlexW3203537837MaRDI QIDQ2100648
Publication date: 24 November 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.007
quadratic scoring ruleunique implementationcommon knowledge on selfishnessethical social choice functionweak honesty
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