Epistemological implementation of social choice functions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.007zbMath1505.91165OpenAlexW3203537837MaRDI QIDQ2100648

Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date: 24 November 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.007

zbMATH Keywords

quadratic scoring ruleunique implementationcommon knowledge on selfishnessethical social choice functionweak honesty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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