Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2366zbMath0911.90011MaRDI QIDQ1268597

Masaki Aoyagi

Publication date: 5 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2366

zbMATH Keywords

existence; compatibility condition; transferable utility; quasi-linear utility functions; Bayesian incentive; budget balance correlated types; compatible mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

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