Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms
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Publication:804453
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90017-EzbMath0727.90007MaRDI QIDQ804453
Louis-André Gérard-Varet, Claude d'Aspremont, Jacques Crémer
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Pareto optimal Bayesian incentive compatiblePareto optimal strongly incentive compatiblePareto-optimal revelation mechanismstruthful revelation of information
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Balanced Bayesian mechanisms ⋮ Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance ⋮ An experimental study of storable votes ⋮ Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus ⋮ The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game. ⋮ Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations ⋮ Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance ⋮ Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: An overview ⋮ Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models ⋮ Knowledge as a public good: Efficient sharing and incentives for development effort ⋮ Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
Cites Work
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- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
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