Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90017-EzbMATH Open0727.90007MaRDI QIDQ804453FDOQ804453

Authors: Cl. d'Aspremont, Jacques Crémer, Louis-André Gérard-Varet 

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimal Bayesian incentive compatiblePareto optimal strongly incentive compatiblePareto-optimal revelation mechanismstruthful revelation of information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
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• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
• Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
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• Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication
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• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
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• Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs

Cited In (21)

• Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: An overview
• Knowledge as a public good: Efficient sharing and incentives for development effort
• An experimental study of storable votes
• Pivot mechanisms as a link between probability and preference revelation
• Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
• Finite allocation mechanisms: approximate walrasian versus approximate direct revelation
• Endogenous verifiability and optimality in agency
• The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings
• Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
• The Mixed Effect of Voluntary Revelation: Evidence from Threshold Public Goods Game Experiments
• Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
• Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
• The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
• Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Some remarks on Bayesian mechanism design
• On the difficulty of eliciting summary information
• Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
• Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance

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