An experimental study of storable votes
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
- An experimental study of storable votes
- Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms
- Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges
- Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Storable votes
- Voting with Proportional Veto Power
Cited in
(15)- Mean versus median voting in multi-dimensional budget allocation problems. A laboratory experiment
- A method for identifying parameterizations of the compensation election and quadratic voting that admit pure-strategy equilibria
- An experimental study of storable votes
- Storable votes
- Democracy for polarized committees: the tale of Blotto's lieutenants
- A simple mechanism for resolving conflict
- Trading votes for votes: a laboratory study
- Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
- Induced-value tests of the referendum voting mechanism
- Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets
- Efficient voting with penalties
- One man, one bid
- Minority turnout and representation under cumulative voting. An experiment.
- Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes
- An experimental study of voting with costly delay
This page was built for publication: An experimental study of storable votes
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q863272)
