A method for identifying parameterizations of the compensation election and quadratic voting that admit pure-strategy equilibria
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1817998 (Why is no real title available?)
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 473381 (Why is no real title available?)
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- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- An experimental study of storable votes
- Convolution of unimodal distributions can produce any number of modes
- On the existence of monotone pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games
- One man, one bid
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Ranking auctions with risk adverse bidders
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- Unimodality of infinitely divisible distribution functions of class L
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