A method for identifying parameterizations of the compensation election and quadratic voting that admit pure-strategy equilibria
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Publication:6163301
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.01.002zbMath1519.91102OpenAlexW4316039520MaRDI QIDQ6163301
Roumen Vragov, Vernon L. Smith
Publication date: 26 June 2023
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.01.002
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