A method for identifying parameterizations of the compensation election and quadratic voting that admit pure-strategy equilibria

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2023.01.002zbMATH Open1519.91102OpenAlexW4316039520MaRDI QIDQ6163301FDOQ6163301

Authors: Roumen Vragov, Vernon L. Smith 

Publication date: 26 June 2023

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.01.002

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zbMATH Keywords

direct democracyvoting systemsBayes-Nash equilibriacompensation electionquadratic voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• On the existence of monotone pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games
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• One man, one bid
• An experimental study of storable votes
• Ranking auctions with risk adverse bidders
• Convolution of unimodal distributions can produce any number of modes

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