Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.09.009zbMATH Open1419.91257OpenAlexW3122178796MaRDI QIDQ1735752FDOQ1735752

Authors: Matías Núñez, Marcus Pivato 

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.009

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zbMATH Keywords

strategic votinglarge electionsBayesian Nash implementationstochastic voting ruletruth-revelation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
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Cited In (8)

• Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections
• Beyond plurality: truth-bias in binary scoring rules
• A method for identifying parameterizations of the compensation election and quadratic voting that admit pure-strategy equilibria
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Plurality voting with truth-biased agents
• False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives

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