Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
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Publication:1735752
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.09.009zbMATH Open1419.91257OpenAlexW3122178796MaRDI QIDQ1735752FDOQ1735752
Authors: Matías Núñez, Marcus Pivato 
Publication date: 29 March 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.009
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Cited In (11)
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- Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
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