Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1735752
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.009zbMath1419.91257OpenAlexW3122178796MaRDI QIDQ1735752
Publication date: 29 March 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.009
Related Items
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Handbook on approval voting
- Manipulation in elections with uncertain preferences
- Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility
- Sincere voting in large elections
- Unanimous rules in the laboratory
- A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote
- Generalized Gini inequality indices
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- A note on asymptotical strategy-proofness
- A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
- On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules
- Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
- The strategic sincerity of approval voting
- How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
- On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules
- The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles
- Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy
- Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Strategic Voting Without Collusion Under Binary and Democratic Group Decision Rules
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
- Cheatproofness Properties of the Plurality Rule in Large Societies
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- Relative Utilitarianism
- Strategy-proofness in the Large
- An Incentive‐Compatible Condorcet Jury Theorem*
