Sincere voting in large elections

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.03.010zbMATH Open1393.91044OpenAlexW2185328024MaRDI QIDQ523009FDOQ523009

Authors Adam Meirowitz, Avidit Acharya

Publication date 20 April 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.010

zbMATH Keywords

strategic votinginformative votingsincere voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences
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Cites work

• The calculus of ethical voting
• The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information

Cited in

(7)

• Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
• A concept of sincerity for combinatorial voting
• What proportion of sincere voters guarantees efficiency?
• Sincere voting in models of legislative elections
• Supertypes of voters in a model of general elections
• Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences
• Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms

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