Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms

DOI10.1007/S00355-009-0374-8zbMATH Open1190.91043OpenAlexW2074130938MaRDI QIDQ836932FDOQ836932

Authors: Miguel A. Ballester, Pedro Rey-Biel 

Publication date: 9 September 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0374-8

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
• A model of noisy introspection.
• Voting systems that combine approval and preference
• Evolution of smart\(_ n\) players
• Storable votes
• On the justice of decision rules
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Approval voting with endogenous candidates
• A Model for Strategic Voting
• Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms

Cited In (8)

• The strategic sincerity of approval voting
• Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms
• Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
• What proportion of sincere voters guarantees efficiency?
• Fully sincere voting
• Information sharing in democratic mechanisms
• Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences
• Sincere voting in large elections

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