Fully sincere voting
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Publication:1036599
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.001zbMath1188.91064OpenAlexW2061384221MaRDI QIDQ1036599
Publication date: 13 November 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.001
Related Items (3)
Two field experiments on approval voting in Germany ⋮ The strategic sincerity of approval voting ⋮ Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
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