Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
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Publication:697934
DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2794zbMATH Open1127.91327OpenAlexW2009554685MaRDI QIDQ697934FDOQ697934
Authors: Jean-Pierre Benoît 
Publication date: 18 September 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2794
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Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Voting by Committees
- Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
Cited In (33)
- Social Choice Theory
- On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
- A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives
- Manipulation in elections with uncertain preferences
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation
- Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences
- Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
- Tops-only domains
- Arrovian aggregation for preferences over sets
- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
- A unifying impossibility theorem
- Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
- On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
- Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences
- Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes
- Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
- An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo
- A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
- Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures
- Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
- Choosers as extension axioms
- Fully sincere voting
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes
- Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers
- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
- Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games
- Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
- Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties
- Uniform expected utility criteria for decision making under ignorance or objective ambiguity
- Strategic voting in the context of stable-matching of teams
- Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
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