Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2794zbMath1127.91327MaRDI QIDQ697934

Jean-Pierre Benoît

Publication date: 18 September 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2794

zbMATH Keywords

ties; social choice; lotteries; strategyproofness; Gibbard; Satterthwaite

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B12: Voting theory

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule, Arrovian aggregation for preferences over sets, On strategy-proof social choice correspondences, Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences, Choosers as extension axioms, Fully sincere voting, Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures, On the manipulation of social choice correspondences, A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions, Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes, Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
• Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
• Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
• Voting by Committees
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance