Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
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Publication:697934
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2794zbMath1127.91327OpenAlexW2009554685MaRDI QIDQ697934
Publication date: 18 September 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2794
Related Items (27)
Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures ⋮ Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation ⋮ On the manipulation of social choice correspondences ⋮ A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions ⋮ On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions ⋮ A unifying impossibility theorem ⋮ Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers ⋮ Evaluationwise strategy-proofness ⋮ Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties ⋮ A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives ⋮ Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness ⋮ Tops-only domains ⋮ Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences ⋮ Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes ⋮ Uniform expected utility criteria for decision making under ignorance or objective ambiguity ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness ⋮ Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules ⋮ Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences ⋮ Arrovian aggregation for preferences over sets ⋮ An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo ⋮ Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule ⋮ On strategy-proof social choice correspondences ⋮ Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences ⋮ Choosers as extension axioms ⋮ Fully sincere voting ⋮ Social Choice Theory
Cites Work
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- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- Voting by Committees
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
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