Choosers as extension axioms
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Publication:1036106
DOI10.1007/s11238-008-9113-3zbMath1186.91087MaRDI QIDQ1036106
Publication date: 4 November 2009
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9113-3
91B14: Social choice
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Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness, Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting, Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules, Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences, Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties
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