Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences

DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9066-yzbMath1186.91097MaRDI QIDQ1036099

Burak Can, M. Remzi Sanver, Bora Erdamar

Publication date: 4 November 2009

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9066-y

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofness; expected utility consistency; preferences over sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B06: Decision theory

91B16: Utility theory

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Bargaining through approval, Choosers as extension axioms, Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting, A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions, Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes, A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions

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