A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives

DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0755-XzbMATH Open1302.91089OpenAlexW2012757997MaRDI QIDQ404746FDOQ404746

Authors Shin Sato 

Publication date 4 September 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0755-x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2182815 (Why is no real title available?)
• A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
• Circular domains
• Dictatorial domains
• Manipulation and the Pareto rule
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences
• Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
• Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
• Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

Cited in

(11)

• Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
• Restricted preference domains in social choice: two perspectives
• On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
• Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model
• Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes
• On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
• Identification of domain restrictions over which acyclic, continuous-valued, and positive responsive social choice rules operate
• Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
• Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets
• Strategic Abstention based on Preference Extensions: Positive Results and Computer-Generated Impossibilities
• Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties

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