A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives
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Publication:404746
DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0755-XzbMATH Open1302.91089OpenAlexW2012757997MaRDI QIDQ404746FDOQ404746
Authors: Shin Sato 
Publication date: 4 September 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0755-x
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Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Circular domains
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
- Manipulation and the Pareto rule
- Dictatorial domains
- Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences
- A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
- Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
Cited In (11)
- Strategic Abstention based on Preference Extensions: Positive Results and Computer-Generated Impossibilities
- On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
- Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets
- Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model
- Identification of domain restrictions over which acyclic, continuous-valued, and positive responsive social choice rules operate
- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
- Restricted preference domains in social choice: two perspectives
- Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
- Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
- Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes
- Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties
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