On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions

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Cited In (3)

Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences
Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties

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