On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3646588 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3976693 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2182815 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7657254 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Rank-based choice correspondences
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- Social choice and individual values
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- Tournament solutions
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