Manipulation of social choice functions
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Positionalist voting functions
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Social choice and individual values
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
Cited in
(87)- Selections from ordered sets
- New problems in the general choice theory
- Rawlsian maximin, Dutch books, and non-additive expected utility
- Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
- Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
- Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules
- Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
- On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
- Practical reasoning using values: an argumentative approach based on a hierarchy of values
- A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set
- Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
- Manipulability in a group activity selection problem
- Efficient spatial competition
- The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
- On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures
- Uncertainty with ordinal likelihood information
- Condorcet completion methods that inhibit manipulation through exploiting knowledge of electorate preferences
- Manipulation and the Pareto rule
- Strong and weak acyclicity in iterative voting
- Order extensions, budget correspondences, and rational choice
- Set choice problems with incomplete information about the preferences of the decision maker
- Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
- Sufficient conditions making lexicographic rules over the power set satisfy extensibility
- Signed orders and power set extensions
- Iterative voting and acyclic games
- Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
- Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- Binary interactions and subset choice
- Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions
- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
- Almost optimal manipulation of pairwise comparisons of alternatives
- Scores of hesitant fuzzy elements revisited: \textit{``Was sind und was sollen}
- On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
- Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
- Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
- Strategic manipulation and the use of individual decision rules
- Signed orders in linear and nonlinear utility theory
- Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
- On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
- The Pareto rule and strategic voting
- Merging epistemic states and manipulation
- On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
- An axiomatic characterization of the lexicographic maximin extension of an ordering over a set to the power set
- Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences
- Length and cycle equalization
- Multivalued social choice functions and strategic manipulation with counterthreats
- On manipulation in merging epistemic states
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- A note on the extension of a binary relation on a set to the power set
- A new informational base for social choice
- No minimally reasonable collective-choice process can be strategy-proof
- Dominant strategies and restricted ballots with variable electorate
- A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
- Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
- Assigning numerical scores to linguistic expressions
- Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs
- Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
- A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions
- Extending an order on a set to the power set: Some remarks on Kannai and Peleg's approach
- On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives
- Choosers as extension axioms
- Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7450033 (Why is no real title available?)
- Sequentially consistent rules of choice under complete uncertainty
- Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes
- Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting
- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7596800 (Why is no real title available?)
- Reasoning about manipulation in multi-agent systems
- Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
- Population evaluation functions: Axiomatizations of two utilitarian principles
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties
- An extension of the Moulin no show paradox for voting correspondences
- Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
- Extension of an order on a set to the power set: Some further observations
- On the extension of preferences over a set to the power set: An axiomatic characterization of a quasi-ordering
- Strategy-proof interval-social choice correspondences over extended single-peaked domains
- Multivalued decision rules and coalitional nonmanipulability. Two possibility theorems
- Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
- Preference relations
- Min-max decision rules for choice under complete uncertainty: axiomatic characterizations for preferences over utility intervals
- Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings
- Preferences on subsets
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