Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules
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Cites work
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3635767 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulation and the Pareto rule
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Manipulation of social decision functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Social choice and individual values
- Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
- Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
- The bargaining problem
- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
- Threats, Counter-Threats, and Strategic Voting
Cited in
(5)- On a class of strictly nonmanipulable collective choice rules
- Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions
- Manipulation of nonimposed, nonoligarchic, nonbinary group decision rules
- Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
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