Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
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(63)- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
- Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences
- Choosers as extension axioms
- On a class of strictly nonmanipulable collective choice rules
- On the extension of preferences over a set to the power set: An axiomatic characterization of a quasi-ordering
- A new informational base for social choice
- Manipulation and the Pareto rule
- Strategic manipulation and the use of individual decision rules
- Double deception: Two against one in three-person games
- Multivalued social choice functions and strategic manipulation with counterthreats
- Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules
- No minimally reasonable collective-choice process can be strategy-proof
- Dominant strategies and restricted ballots with variable electorate
- Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
- Iterative voting and acyclic games
- Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
- Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
- Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
- Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
- Merging epistemic states and manipulation
- Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
- On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
- A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
- Manipulability of consular election rules
- Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes
- Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
- Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
- A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions
- Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
- Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
- Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties
- Strong and weak acyclicity in iterative voting
- The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
- Multivalued decision rules and coalitional nonmanipulability. Two possibility theorems
- On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
- Strategic voting under uncertainty about the voting method
- On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
- Social Choice Theory
- FUZZY VOTERS, CRISP VOTES
- Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
- Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions
- Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
- On manipulation in merging epistemic states
- Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
- Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
- Strategy-proof interval-social choice correspondences over extended single-peaked domains
- Constraints and lifting-based (conditional) preferences in abstract argumentation
- Ranking rankings: an axiomatic analysis
- Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
- Bargaining through approval
- Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule
- Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings
- On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives
- Extending an order on a set to the power set: Some remarks on Kannai and Peleg's approach
- An axiomatic characterization of the lexicographic maximin extension of an ordering over a set to the power set
- Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
- Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations
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