Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences

DOI10.1007/S11238-007-9066-YMaRDI QIDQ1036099zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Burak Can, Bora Erdamar, M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date 4 November 2009

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9066-y

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessexpected utility consistencypreferences over sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14) Utility theory (91B16)

Recommendations

• Set comparisons in a general domain: the indirect utility criterion
• On the extension of preferences over a set to the power set: An axiomatic characterization of a quasi-ordering
• Choosers as extension axioms
• A uniqueness result for extending orders; with application to collective choice as inconsistency resolution
• Expected utility without full transitivity

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2182815 (Why is no real title available?)
• Even-chance lotteries in social choice theory
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
• Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
• Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
• Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance

Cited in

(12)

• Extension problem for principles of equivalent utility
• Choosers as extension axioms
• Dynamic consistency implies approximately expected utility preferences
• Reference-dependent expected utility with incomplete preferences
• A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
• Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting
• Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes
• A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions
• Ranking Sets of Objects: The Complexity of Avoiding Impossibility Results
• Bargaining through approval
• Utilitarian Preferences With Multiple Priors
• Continuous extension of preferences

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