Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- Set comparisons in a general domain: the indirect utility criterion
- On the extension of preferences over a set to the power set: An axiomatic characterization of a quasi-ordering
- Choosers as extension axioms
- A uniqueness result for extending orders; with application to collective choice as inconsistency resolution
- Expected utility without full transitivity
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2182815 (Why is no real title available?)
- Even-chance lotteries in social choice theory
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
- Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
Cited in
(12)- Extension problem for principles of equivalent utility
- Choosers as extension axioms
- Dynamic consistency implies approximately expected utility preferences
- Reference-dependent expected utility with incomplete preferences
- A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
- Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting
- Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes
- A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions
- Ranking Sets of Objects: The Complexity of Avoiding Impossibility Results
- Bargaining through approval
- Utilitarian Preferences With Multiple Priors
- Continuous extension of preferences
This page was built for publication: Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1036099)