Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting

DOI10.1007/s11238-012-9301-zzbMath1273.91133OpenAlexW1969987467MaRDI QIDQ1945667

Ulle Endriss

Publication date: 8 April 2013

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9301-z

zbMATH Keywords

manipulationapproval votingranking sets of objects

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items

Justified representation in approval-based committee voting ⋮ Iterative voting and acyclic games ⋮ Equilibria in Doodle polls under three tie-breaking rules ⋮ Decentralized update selection with semi-strategic experts ⋮ The strategic sincerity of approval voting ⋮ Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences ⋮ Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: an impossibility result ⋮ Bargaining through approval ⋮ Structural control in weighted voting games

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