Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_20zbMATH Open1348.91092OpenAlexW92672591MaRDI QIDQ2829693FDOQ2829693

M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date: 8 November 2016

Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_20

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• Social choice and individual values
• The Bargaining Problem
• On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
• Rational Selection of Decision Functions
• Monotonicity paradoxes in the theory of elections
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• A dictionary for voting paradoxes
• The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
• Approval Voting in Large Electorates
• Handbook of mathematical economics. Volume III
• A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking
• Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
• A `threshold aggregation' of three-graded rankings
• The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
• Synopses in the Theory of Choice
• The Basic Approval Voting Game
• Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections
• Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
• Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting

Cited In (10)

• The strategic sincerity of approval voting
• Clustering alternatives in preference-approvals via novel pseudometrics
• On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
• Analysing a preference and approval profile
• An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation
• Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting
• Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
• The broken Borda rule and other refinements of approval ranking
• A family of distances for preference-approvals
• On the definition of favorableness

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