Approval as an intrinsic part of preference

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_20MaRDI QIDQ2829693zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date 8 November 2016

Published in Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_20

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Majority-approval social choice
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• Social choice and individual values
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• Voting systems that combine approval and preference

Cited in

(11)

• An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation
• Analysing a preference and approval profile
• A family of distances for preference-approvals
• Clustering alternatives in preference-approvals via novel pseudometrics
• Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting
• On the definition of favorableness
• On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
• Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
• The strategic sincerity of approval voting
• The broken Borda rule and other refinements of approval ranking
• Majority-approval social choice

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