scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3642995
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Publication:3048536
Cited in
(19)- Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
- Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
- Criteria for judging the rationality of decisions in the presence of vague alternatives
- Extending tournament solutions
- On the structure of stable tournament solutions
- Stochastic semi-orders
- Set and revealed preference axioms for multi-valued choice
- Path-independent consideration
- Minimal extending sets in tournaments
- Statement of precedence and a comment on IIA terminology
- A refinement of the uncovered set in tournaments
- Approval as an intrinsic part of preference
- On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results
- Two‐stage majoritarian choice
- Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
- Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability
- Minimal covering set solutions
- Aggregation of preferences: The fuzzy case
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
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