Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.03.006zbMATH Open1247.91056arXiv0910.3580OpenAlexW2034375542MaRDI QIDQ634537FDOQ634537

Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein

Publication date: 16 August 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: A common assumption in modern microeconomic theory is that choice should be rationalizable via a binary preference relation, which citeauthor{Sen71a} showed to be equivalent to two consistency conditions, namely $alpha$ (contraction) and $gamma$ (expansion). Within the context of emph{social} choice, however, rationalizability and similar notions of consistency have proved to be highly problematic, as witnessed by a range of impossibility results, among which Arrow's is the most prominent. Since choice functions select emph{sets} of alternatives rather than single alternatives, we propose to rationalize choice functions by preference relations over sets (set-rationalizability). We also introduce two consistency conditions, $hatalpha$ and $hatgamma$, which are defined in analogy to $alpha$ and $gamma$, and find that a choice function is set-rationalizable if and only if it satisfies $hatalpha$. Moreover, a choice function satisfies $hatalpha$ and $hatgamma$ if and only if it is emph{self-stable}, a new concept based on earlier work by citeauthor{Dutt88a}. The class of self-stable social choice functions contains a number of appealing Condorcet extensions such as the minimal covering set and the essential set.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0910.3580

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zbMATH Keywords

consistencysocial choice theoryrationalizabilitychoice theorystable sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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• Extending tournament solutions
• Indepth combinatorial analysis of admissible sets for abstract argumentation
• Minimal extending sets in tournaments
• On rational choice from lists of sets
• Rationalizable choice functions
• WARP and combinatorial choice
• Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
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• Minimal retentive sets in tournaments
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