Impossibility theorems involving weakenings of expansion consistency and resoluteness in voting

DOI10.1090/CONM/795/15968MaRDI QIDQ6494745FDOQ6494745

Authors: Wesley H. Holliday, Chase Norman, Eric Pacuit, Saam Zahedian 

Publication date: 30 April 2024

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zbMATH Keywords

votingsocial choice theorySAT solvingformal verificationimpossibility theoremsexpansion consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• Title not available (Why is that?)
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• Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness via SMT solving
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• The supercovering relation, the pairwise winner, and more missing links between Borda and Condorcet
• Analysing irresolute multiwinner voting rules with approval ballots via SAT solving
• Two‐stage majoritarian choice
• Strategic Abstention based on Preference Extensions: Positive Results and Computer-Generated Impossibilities

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