Impossibility theorems involving weakenings of expansion consistency and resoluteness in voting
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6494745
Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4005933 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7657254 (Why is no real title available?)
- A dynamical model of political equilibrium
- A mathematical introduction to logic.
- A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Algorithms for computing minimal unsatisfiable subsets of constraints
- Analysing irresolute multiwinner voting rules with approval ballots via SAT solving
- Automated search for impossibility theorems in social choice theory: ranking sets of objects
- Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
- Cognitive constraints, contraction consistency, and the satisficing criterion
- Comparison functions and choice correspondences
- Complete independence of clones in the ranked pairs rule
- Disposing dictators, demystifying voting paradoxes. Social choice analysis
- Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT solving
- Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
- Model theory.
- On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results
- Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving
- Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness via SMT solving
- Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability
- Social choice and individual values
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- Strategic Abstention based on Preference Extensions: Positive Results and Computer-Generated Impossibilities
- The Voting Problem
- The impartial, anonymous, and neutral culture model: a probability model for sampling public preference structures
- The supercovering relation, the pairwise winner, and more missing links between Borda and Condorcet
- Two‐stage majoritarian choice
- Uncovered sets
- Uniform generation of anonymous and neutral preference profiles for social choice rules
This page was built for publication: Impossibility theorems involving weakenings of expansion consistency and resoluteness in voting
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6494745)
