The impartial, anonymous, and neutral culture model: a probability model for sampling public preference structures

DOI10.1080/0022250X.2011.597012MaRDI QIDQ2864697zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors Ömer Eğecioğlu, Ayça Ebru Giritligil

Publication date 26 November 2013

Published in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmsconsensusdiscrete choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3126031 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49672 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1181673 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3223737 (Why is no real title available?)
• Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study
• On probability models in voting theory
• The probability of a Condorcet winner with a small number of voters
• The random selection of unlabeled graphs
• Uniform generation of anonymous and neutral preference profiles for social choice rules

Cited in

(11)

• The manipulability index in the IANC model
• Breaking ties in collective decision-making
• Smoothed analysis of social choice revisited
• Combinatorics of Election Scores
• Impossibility theorems involving weakenings of expansion consistency and resoluteness in voting
• The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
• Anonymous and neutral social choice: a unified framework for existence results, maximal domains and tie-breaking
• The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions
• Isomorphic Distances Among Elections
• Uniform generation of anonymous and neutral preference profiles for social choice rules
• On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Mathematica

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