The Impartial, Anonymous, and Neutral Culture Model: A Probability Model for Sampling Public Preference Structures
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Publication:2864697
DOI10.1080/0022250X.2011.597012zbMATH Open1276.91047WikidataQ115927214 ScholiaQ115927214MaRDI QIDQ2864697FDOQ2864697
Ömer Eğecioğlu, Ayça Ebru Giritligil
Publication date: 26 November 2013
Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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- Uniform generation of anonymous and neutral preference profiles for social choice rules
- On probability models in voting theory
- The random selection of unlabeled graphs
- The probability of a Condorcet winner with a small number of voters
- Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study
Cited In (9)
- The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions
- The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
- Isomorphic Distances Among Elections
- On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules
- Smoothed analysis of social choice revisited
- Breaking ties in collective decision-making
- Combinatorics of Election Scores
- Impossibility theorems involving weakenings of expansion consistency and resoluteness in voting
- Anonymous and neutral social choice: a unified framework for existence results, maximal domains and tie-breaking
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