An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules
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Publication:449045
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.12.005zbMATH Open1246.91046OpenAlexW1970922082MaRDI QIDQ449045FDOQ449045
Authors: Mostapha Diss, Ahmed Louichi, Hatem Smaoui, Vincent Merlin 
Publication date: 11 September 2012
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.12.005
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Cites Work
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- Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
- On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules
Cited In (14)
- A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity
- Exploiting polyhedral symmetries in social choice
- Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results
- Likelihood of voting outcomes with generalized IAC probabilities
- The impartial, anonymous, and neutral culture model: a probability model for sampling public preference structures
- On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
- Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
- The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner
- Combinatorics of Election Scores
- IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
- Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
- Uniform generation of anonymous and neutral preference profiles for social choice rules
- Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
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