An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.12.005MaRDI QIDQ449045zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mostapha Diss, Ahmed Louichi, Hatem Smaoui, Vincent Merlin

Publication date 11 September 2012

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.12.005

zbMATH Keywords

convex polytopescoring rulesEhrhart polynomialsvoting rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3163858 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1405493 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Counting Integral Points in Polyhedra When the Dimension is Fixed
• Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Effective lattice point counting in rational convex polytopes
• Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
• On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules
• Points entiers dans les polyèdres convexes
• Polynômes arithmétiques et méthode des polyedres en combinatoire
• Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
• Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
• Self-selection consistent functions
• Sur un probl?me de g?om?trie diophantienne lin?aire. I. Poly?dres et r?seaux.

Cited in

(14)

• Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results
• Exploiting polyhedral symmetries in social choice
• Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
• Combinatorics of Election Scores
• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
• IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
• A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity
• The impartial, anonymous, and neutral culture model: a probability model for sampling public preference structures
• Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
• Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
• Likelihood of voting outcomes with generalized IAC probabilities
• On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules
• Uniform generation of anonymous and neutral preference profiles for social choice rules
• The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner

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