Self-selection consistent functions

DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2860MaRDI QIDQ697836zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Carmen Beviá, Salvador Barberà

Publication date 17 September 2002

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/2a05f9423d1fc7a3eb3b0ede231d3ce205f603e5

zbMATH Keywords

participationsocial choice rulesallocation consistencycondorcet criterion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
• Consistency and its converse: an introduction
• Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
• Stability and segregation in group formation
• Stable coalition structures with a unidimensional set of alternatives

Cited in

(24)

• Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules.
• Condorcet winner configurations of linear networks
• Selection closedness and scoring correspondences
• Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
• Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
• Weighted majoritarian rules for the location of multiple public facilities
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 497642 (Why is no real title available?)
• Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
• Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems
• The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks
• Consistent representative democracy
• Self-consistency of decision rules for group decision making
• Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
• How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
• Self-selective social choice functions
• On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules
• Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle
• On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules
• Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains
• An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules
• Strategy-proof rules for two public goods: double median rules
• Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain
• Efficiency and consistency for locating multiple public facilities
• Locating public facilities by majority: stability, consistency and group formation

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