Recommendations
- Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain
- Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
- Self-selection consistent functions
- Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
- Intrinsic properties of the self-consistent choice rule
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
- A crash course in implementation theory
- Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain
- Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
- Complete independence of clones in the ranked pairs rule
- Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
- Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
- Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
- Self-selection consistent functions
- Self-selective social choice functions
- Social choice and individual values
- Tournament solutions and majority voting
Cited in
(18)- Self-selective social choice functions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 497642 (Why is no real title available?)
- Self-selection consistent functions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7431114 (Why is no real title available?)
- Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
- Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
- Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
- Hyper-stable social welfare functions
- Selectivity in hierarchical social systems
- Selection closedness and scoring correspondences
- Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability
- Social choice function with subordinate relations as one variable
- On strongly consistent social choice functions
- Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain
- Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray
- On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules
- Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains
- Consistent social choice functions and systems of distinct representatives
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