Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
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Publication:4530979
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00143zbMATH Open1026.91509OpenAlexW1972967438MaRDI QIDQ4530979FDOQ4530979
Authors: Semih Koray 
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/24963
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- Dependence and Independence in Social Choice: Arrow’s Theorem
- Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study
- Consistent representative democracy
- Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability
- Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
- On strongly consistent social choice functions
- In the beginning there were \(n\) agents: founding and amending a constitution
- Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain
- Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray
- On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules
- Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains
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