Hyper-stable social welfare functions
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Publication:5964647
DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0908-1zbMath1341.91070OpenAlexW2614573539MaRDI QIDQ5964647
Lainé, Jean, M. Remzi Sanver, Ali Ihsan Ozkes
Publication date: 1 March 2016
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0908-1
Related Items (3)
Representative democracy and the implementation of majority-preferred alternatives ⋮ Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains ⋮ Metrizable preferences over preferences
Cites Work
- Representative democracy and the implementation of majority-preferred alternatives
- Hyper-stable collective rankings
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- Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings
- An example in group preference
- Tournament solutions and majority voting
- Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations
- Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain
- Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
- Majority voting on orders
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