Representative democracy and the implementation of majority-preferred alternatives

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0922-3MaRDI QIDQ284362zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Katherine Baldiga Coffman

Publication date 18 May 2016

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:37221621

zbMATH Keywords

direct democracyrepresentative democracyvoters' preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Individual preferences (91B08) Group preferences (91B10)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1470897 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3405712 (Why is no real title available?)
• A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality
• Assent-maximizing social choice
• Combinatorial voting
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-40), Volume IV
• Hyper-stable social welfare functions
• Majority voting on orders
• Social choice and individual values
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings
• The bipartisan set of a tournament game
• Tournament solutions and majority voting

Cited in

(7)

• Social insurance with representative democracy
• Hyper-stable social welfare functions
• Strategyproof and efficient preference aggregation with Kemeny-based criteria
• Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
• The Condorcet set: majority voting over interconnected propositions
• Implementing direct democracy via representation
• Weighted representative democracy

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