Representative democracy and the implementation of majority-preferred alternatives

DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0922-3zbMath1422.91635OpenAlexW1699522006MaRDI QIDQ284362

Katherine Baldiga Coffman

Publication date: 18 May 2016

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:37221621

zbMATH Keywords

direct democracyrepresentative democracyvoters' preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Group preferences (91B10) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (5)

Weighted representative democracy ⋮ Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures ⋮ The Condorcet set: majority voting over interconnected propositions ⋮ Hyper-stable social welfare functions ⋮ Strategyproof and efficient preference aggregation with Kemeny-based criteria

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings
• The bipartisan set of a tournament game
• Tournament solutions and majority voting
• Assent-maximizing social choice
• Combinatorial Voting
• Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-40), Volume IV
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Majority voting on orders
• A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality
• Hyper-stable social welfare functions

This page was built for publication: Representative democracy and the implementation of majority-preferred alternatives