The Condorcet set: majority voting over interconnected propositions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.12.013MaRDI QIDQ402080zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Klaus Nehring, Marcus Pivato, Clemens Puppe

Publication date 27 August 2014

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://publikationen.bibliothek.kit.edu/1000037498/2876486

zbMATH Keywords

indeterminacyjudgement aggregationsocial choicepath-dependenceCondorcet setsequential majority voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

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• Geometric models of consistent judgement aggregation
• How indeterminate is sequential majority voting? A judgement aggregation perspective
• Incoherent majorities: the McGarvey problem in judgement aggregation
• Majority voting on restricted domains
• Representative democracy and the implementation of majority-preferred alternatives
• Separability and aggregation of equivalence relations
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• Tournament solutions and majority voting

Cited in

(18)

• Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making
• A possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions
• Incoherent majorities: the McGarvey problem in judgement aggregation
• Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others
• A partial taxonomy of judgment aggregation rules and their properties
• The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization
• Weighted representative democracy
• Social choice and the logic of simple games
• The complexity landscape of outcome determination in judgment aggregation
• The median rule in judgement aggregation
• Majority rule in the absence of a majority
• Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation
• Majority judgment over a convex candidate space
• Judgments aggregation by a sequential majority procedure
• How indeterminate is sequential majority voting? A judgement aggregation perspective
• Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
• The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions
• Collective combinatorial optimisation as judgment aggregation

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