Incoherent majorities: the McGarvey problem in judgement aggregation
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 439012 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1538119 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3221981 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Formal Theory of Consensus
- Abstract Arrowian aggregation
- Aggregation of binary evaluations for truth-functional agendas
- An extension of a theorem on the aggregation of separable preferences
- Anti-Hadamard matrices, coin weighing, threshold gates, and indecomposable hypergraphs
- Consistent judgement aggregation: the truth-functional case
- Families of \(k\)-independent sets
- How indeterminate is sequential majority voting? A judgement aggregation perspective
- Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments
- On the theory of aggregation
- The Condorcet set: majority voting over interconnected propositions
- The Voting Problem
- The median function on median graphs and semilattices
- The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
- Two applications (for search theory and truth functions) of Sperner type theorems
- Voting paradoxes and digraphs realizations
- What majority decisions are possible
Cited in
(16)- Majority voting on restricted domains
- Majority rule in the absence of a majority
- The Condorcet set: majority voting over interconnected propositions
- Epistemic democracy with correlated voters
- The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation
- Judgments aggregation by a sequential majority procedure
- Approximately classic judgement aggregation
- An extension of McGarvey's theorem from the perspective of the plurality collective choice mechanism
- The rarity of consistent aggregators
- The median rule in judgement aggregation
- How indeterminate is sequential majority voting? A judgement aggregation perspective
- A plea for the majority method in aggregating judgements
- Voting: a machine learning approach
- Weighted representative democracy
- The doctrinal paradox: comparison of decision rules in a probabilistic framework
- The consistency of majority rule
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